Delivery of linear accelerator-generated radiation therapy to cancer patients is typically controlled by a complex network of personal computers (PCs). Specifically, the radiation treatment data, such as the quantity of radiation to deliver and the geometrical configuration of beam-blocking materials (e.g., multi-leaf collimators or MLC) that shape the radiation beam to match the shape of the malignancy within the patient, are typically generated by physicians on a treatment-planning computer (not shown) and are then downloaded into a central database server that is connected with the treatment-planning computer. The central database server also stores other medical and clinical information that are used by a medical institute. The radiation treatment data and other medical and clinical data are then transmitted from the central database server through a network to multiple terminal computers, i.e., terminals 1, 2, and 3, . . . , each of which controls the operation of a set of radiation equipment in a remote treatment room for actual delivery of the radiotherapy, as shown in FIG. 1.
Because radiation treatment data for a particular patient must remain secure throughout the course of treatment, which typically runs for weeks, there is a potential risk that the radiotherapy data stored in the central database server may become corrupted subsequent to the initial verification and approval of such data. Furthermore, although low-level network protocols contain safeguards against the miscommunication of data, the possibility nevertheless exists that radiation treatment data may be incorrectly transmitted between any of the data transmission links between the central database server and the individual terminal computers.
Execution of such miscommunicated or corrupted radiation treatment data by the radiation treatment equipment can lead to patient harm and potential medical malpractice liability. In April 2005, the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) reported an incident in which the miscommunication of radiation treatment data between two computers led to the over-treatment of a head and neck cancer patient by 3 to 4 times the intended radiation dose. Reference: FDA Adverse Event Report No. 2914292-2005-00003; New York State Department of Health, Notices No. BERP 2005-1 and BERP 2005-2.
Conventional radiation treatment quality assurance (QA) systems or methods employ actual measurement and calibration of the radiation beams generated by the radiation treatment equipment, as shown in FIG. 1. The dosimetric testing and calibration ensure that the radiation treatment equipment accurately delivers the specified amounts of radiation at the specified locations, according to the radiation treatment data furnished by the terminal computers. Typically, a dosimetric verification measurement of specific patient delivery plans is performed a few days before the commencement of that patient's course of treatment. However, because this measurement is time consuming, it is usually done only once. Unfortunately, such conventional dosimetric approaches cannot prevent the apparently “correct” execution of miscommunicated or corrupted radiation treatment data by the equipment at the actual time of treatment, which can lead to severe radiation over-doses.
Therefore, a need exists for a method and system for providing real-time verification of the radiation treatment data and real-time detection of data error caused by either miscommunication or corruption during storage, immediately before each actual delivery of radiation treatment to the patients.
In addition, the FDA characterizes the central database server and the terminal control computers as parts of the radiation treatment system and prohibits users from tampering or otherwise modifying them.
Accordingly, there is a further need for a method and system that can successfully carry out data verification and data error detection functions without modifying any portion of the FDA-approved radiation treatment system, including the transmitting computer and the terminal control computers.